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DOMESTIC RELATIONS —  COMMON LAW MARRIAGE —  APPLI­
CATION OF ENGLISH LAW TO COLONY —  NEW BRUNSWICK 
MARRIAGE ACT, R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 139 —  NECESSARY INTENTION.
The Marriage Act of New Brunswick1 sets out a procedure 
by which a valid marriage may be contracted. It is clear that a 
marriage performed here in accordance with the Act will be 
valid in form, but there is no provision specifically invalidating 
a marriage which has not been performed in conformity with its 
terms. There is then a question whether conformance to the terms 
of the Act is essential to contracting a valid marriage in this 
province. The question does not appear to have come directly 
before the New Brunswick courts.
If an alleged marriage has not been solemnized in conformity 
with the Act, any validity it has must be derived from the common 
law. The nature of the ceremony required to contract a marriage 
at common law was “involved in much obscurity” .* While it is 
not necessary for the purposes of this note to determine precisely 
what these requirements were, the principle of common law m ar­
riage must briefly be examined as it existed in England and in 
the colonies. It will then be necessary to determine whether this 
principle continues to exist in New Brunswick in the face of the 
Marriage Act.
The mere fact that two people agreed to, and did live together 
as man and wife was never sufficient to constitute a marriage 
under English law. Marriage, under English law, was defined as 
the voluntary union of one man and one woman for life, to the 
exclusion of all others.8 To enter into such a union the common 
law required, as a minimum formality, that the parties agreed to 
be married in the presence of a minister in holy orders.4 The 
English Marriage Act of 1753* provided that only an episcopally 
ordained minister could solemnize marriage. The result of com­
bining this statutory provision with the common law requirement 
is to require all marriages to be solemnized before an episcopally 
ordained clergyman. This conclusion was reached by the House 
of Lords in R. v. Millis8 where a marriage solemnized in Ireland 
before a Presbyterian Minister was held to be invalid.
1 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 139.
2 R. v. Millis (1843-44), 10 C. & F. 532, per Tindal, C.J., at p. 654; 
8 E.R. 844, at p. 899.
3 Hyde  v. Hyde & Woodmansee (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130.
4 R. v. Millis (1843-44), 10 C. & F. 532, per Tindal, C.J., at p. 654;
8 E.R. 844, at p. 899.
5 26 Geo. 2, c. 33.
6 (1843-44), 10C . & F. 532, 8 E.R. 844.
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The law as expressed in R. v. Mil lis has been restricted by 
subsequent decisions to England under the principle that only such 
portions of English law apply to the colonies as are suitable to 
their situation and conditions. Dr. Lushington, in Catterall v. 
Catterall,1 held a marriage performed in New South Wales was a 
valid common law marriage, despite the fact that it had been 
solemnized before a Presbyterian Minister contrary to a local 
statute similar to the English Marriage Act. This decision has been 
approved by both the English Probate, Divorce and Admiralty 
Division8 and by the Privy Council.0 Consequently, whatever the 
statutory requirements for a valid marriage in England may be, 
in the colonies the law may be thus stated:
A valid marriage may be contracted in any place abroad where 
the English common law prevails, if celebrated in accordance with 
that law, provided that the local law is inapplicable or cannot be 
complied with or does not invalidate such a marriage.10
Of the three conditions in the proviso in the quotation, the 
first two would seem inapplicable in New Brunswick. It would 
now be practically impossible to support the validity of a marriage 
on the ground that the local Marriage Act did not apply. Simi­
larly it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to show that 
it was impossible to comply with the Act. The main consideration 
in determining whether the principle of common law marriage 
applies here is: does the Marriage Act invalidate any marriage 
performed in the province which does not conform with its pro­
visions? An affirmative answer must be given to this question only 
if the Act specifically or by necessary intent leads to this result.11 
The New Brunswick Marriage Act contains no express provision 
rendering any marriage invalid.12 The existence of the principle of 
common law marriage depends, therefore, upon the necessary 
intent of the Act.
Conformity with the Marriage Act as a condition of solem­
nizing a marriage came obliquely before the New Brunswick court 
in Currie v. Stairs.13 The action was for slandering the character 
of a married man; the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff was not 
married by a clergyman properly qualified under the Marriage Act 
and was therefore not a married man. Allen, C.J., held that
7 (1847), 1 Rob. Ecc. 579; 163 E.R. 1142.
8 Wolf enden v. Wolf enden, [1946] p. 61.
9 haac Penkas v. Tan Soo Eng., [1953] A.C. 304.
10 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 19, s. 1317, at p. 810.
11 Wylie v. Paton, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 747; see also Penner v. Penner, [1947]
4 D.L.R. 829; Gilham v. Steele, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 89.
12 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 139.
13 (1885), 25 N.B.R. 4.
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there was undoubtedly a marriage de facto but went on to state 
that anyone impeaching the validity of the marriage must discharge 
the onus of rebutting the presumption in favour of its validity.14 
The only defects alleged in this case were formal and it may be 
inferred, though it was not decided, that had the formal defect, 
a failure to comply with the Act, been proved the marriage would 
have been invalid. The reasoning of Allen, C.J., suggests that 
even at this early date (1885) the court considered conformity 
with the Act to be essential. Proof of the de facto marriage 
before any minister in holy orders would have been sufficient to 
solemnize a valid common law marriage and the question of the 
Minister’s coming within the Act would have been immaterial if 
such a marriage was valid.
The effect of a statute similar in terms to the New Brunswick 
Act came before the Court of Appeal of Saskatchewan in Wylie v. 
Paton,15 There the court held that failure to comply with section 3 
of the Marriage Act of that province did not render the marriage 
void. That section18 states that:
N o marriage commissioner shall solemnize marriage unless 
the parties to the intended marriage produce to him the license 
provided for by this Act; and no minister or clergymen or other 
person authorized to perform the ceremony of marriage shall 
solemnize marriage unless the parties to the intended marriage 
produce to him such license or unless the intention of the parties 
to marry has been published . . .
No provision was made in the Act specifically invalidating a mar­
riage not solemnized in conformity with the Act, and none of the 
penalties set out for violation of the Act were directed to  the 
parties to the marriage. Haultain, C.J.S., said:
In the present case the Act under consideration, while 
prohibitive, does not declare a nullity or penalize the parties to 
the marriage . . .  On the highest grounds of public policy, all legal 
presumptions are in favour of the validity of a marriage. I would 
therefore hold the marriage in question not invalid.17
The New Brunswick Act is, like the Saskatchewan Act, pro­
hibitive, but does not declare a nullity. The only penalty provided 
in the Act is set out in section 30 :18
A person who violates any provision of this Act is guilty of 
an offence, and liable to a penalty of not more than one hundred 
dollars.
14 Ibid., at p. 9.
15 [1930] 1 D.L.R. 747.
16 R.S.S., 1930, s. 188, s. 3.
17 Wylie v. Paton, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 747, at p. 752.
18 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 139, s. 30.
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In  view of the fact that the prohibitions in the Act seem to be 
directed to persons solemnizing the marriage, and not to the parties 
to  the marriage, the statement by Haultain, C.J.S., quoted above 
would seem to apply with equal force to the New Brunswick Act.
The New Brunswick Act, however, contains three sections 
which were not included in the Saskatchewan Act interpreted in 
Wylie v. Paton. The first provides that, a marriage shall not be 
solemnized between parties, one of whom is under .eighteen, with­
out consent as specified in the Act, “provided that lack of such 
consent . . . shall not invalidate a marriage” '.10 This last pro­
vision suggests that the effect of non-conformance with the Act 
renders the marriage invalid. The second and third sections not 
included in the Saskatchewan Act provide that marriages not 
solemnized under the Act may in certain cases be deemed valid,20 
or if “solemnized in good faith and in ignorance of the require­
ments of the law by a clergyman who was not at the time duly 
authorized to solemnize marriage”21 may be validated by Order in 
Council. These provisions would be unnecessary if common law 
marriages were intended to be recognized as valid. It appears, 
therefore, that the necessary intent of the Act is to restrict mar­
riages to those solemnized or subsequently validated under its 
terms. This approach is in accord with that taken by the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal. In Gilham v. Steele,22 that court 
dealt with the effect of the British Columbia Marriage Act upon 
a marriage solemnized by a clergyman who was not registered 
under the Act. The Marriage Act there contained a provision,2* 
similar to section 27 (1 ) of the New Brunswick Act, whereby such 
a marriage could be validated; the court held the marriage void 
since it had neither been solemnized nor validated under the 
Marriage Act. O ’Halloran, J.A., disposed of the question as 
follows:24
It appears this deficiency could have been easily cured under 
s. 37(1) of the Marriage Act . . . and the solemnization of the 
marriage thereby made “valid and lawful”. Since this was not done 
it seems to me . . . the provisions of the Marriage Act lead to the 
unavoidable conclusion that the marriage was invalid and 
unlawful and in the result a nullity ab initio.
In separate judgments, Robertson, J.A., and Bird, J.A., gave 
reasons similar to those stated by O ’Halloran, J.A. The conclusion 
which was found “unavoidable” by the British Columbia Court of
19 Ibid., s. 6.
20 Ibid., s. 26.
21 Ibid., s. 27.
22 [19531 2 D.L.R. 89.
23 R.S.B.C., 1948, c. 201, s. 37(1).
24 Gilham  v. Steele, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 89, at p. 90.
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Appeal would seem to be equally so under the New Brunswick 
Marriage Act, with the result that only marriages performed in 
accordance with, or subsequently validated by the terms of the 
Act, are valid in New Brunswick.
Roderick M. Bryden*
REAL PROPERTY —  CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP —  TENANCY BY 
ENTIRETIES —  PROPERTY ACT, R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 177, s. 19 —  
MARRIED WOMAN’S PROPERTY ACT, R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 140, 
s. 2 (c ) —  INTERPRETATION ACT, R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 114, s. 38 (13).
Today we ordinarily hear of only two types of concurrent 
ownership in land: tenancy in common and joint tenancy. How­
ever, the common law knew two other types of concurrent owner­
ship: tenancy by entireties and coparcenary. Coparcenary was 
the descent of land on intestacy in the absence of a male heir 
to several daughters as co-heirs. This form of tenure has now 
vanished because of its inconsistency with the provisions of the 
Devolution of Estates Act.1 But tenancy by entireties raises more 
difficult problems, and the purpose of this note is to consider 
whether or not this old form of common law tenancy has also, 
in effect, been abolished by provincial legislation.
Tenancy by entireties was peculiar to the marital status. If a 
husband and wife took land in such a way as would make them 
joint tenants but for the fact that they were married, they were 
deemed to have taken as tenants by entireties,2 and this was so 
even if the land were expressly conveyed to them as joint tenants.* 
The interests of the spouses were joint and unseverable; neither 
spouse could alienate any part of the estate without obtaining 
permission to do so from the other. Upon the death of one 
spouse, the other became seised of the whole estate, but during 
their joint lives, there were, as between husband and wife, no 
moieties.4 A tenancy by entireties could exist in any estate, 
whether in fee, for life, for years, or otherwise.5
* Roderick M. Bryden, II Law, U.N.B. Mr. Bryden is a Sir James Dunn 
Scholar in Law.
1 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 62.
2 Green d. Crew  v. King (1778), 2 Wm. Bl. 1212, at p. 1212; 96 E.R. 
713, at p. 714.
3 Pollok v. Kelly (1856), 6 I.C.L.R. 367.
4 Marquis of Winchester’s Case (1583), 3 Co. Rep. la, at p. 52; 76 E.R. 
621, at p. 631.
5 Megarry, A Manual of the Law of Real Property, 2nd ed., at p. 261.
